We conduct a two-phase laboratory experiment, separated by several weeks. In the first phase, we conduct urn games intended to measure ambiguity aversion on a representative population of undergraduate students. In the second phase, we invite the students back with four different solicitation treatments, varying in the ambiguity of information regarding the task and the payout of the laboratory experiment.
Introduction
Sample selection issues are relevant for any empirical exercise with human subjects. We study this problem directly, in the context of laboratory experiments in economics.
However, the issue is at least as salient for "field experiments" (see Harrison & List 2004 for an overview). Among other issues, they still need to recruit their subjects, and thus there is the possibility for selection bias. Indeed, no sample is likely to be fully representative; Gronau (1974) is an early paper that worries about just such an effect on wage selectivity in labor markets. We discuss further in the conclusion the relevance for both field experiments and for fully naturally occurring observed data.
In order to directly assess such effects, we hypothesize in advance that a particular recruitment procedure will affect the composition of the subjects who show up to participate. We use standard laboratory protocols for comparability, but the implications are similar for either the lab or the field. In particular, we vary the amount of information (about the task to be performed and/or the expected payment) revealed at the time of recruitment. This is a dimension that varies in any case, but that is not often explicitly considered or controlled for. It also has a natural theoretical link to ambiguity-aversion: an aversion to uncertainty over states of the world about which the probabilities are unknown. 1 We hypothesize that potential subjects who are more ambiguity-averse will be less likely to choose to participate if they have less information about their possible outcomes. Although we focus on this single aspect, we stress that our concern is broader.
Selection biases are likely to be present in almost all situations, along a variety of dimensions, and by definition they are unusually difficult to test for and to control for.
1 Ellsberg (1961) provides the canonical thought experiment, suggesting that individuals, if forced to choose between two lotteries with different amounts of information available, will prefer to bet on one with a known but unfavorable probability of winning rather than on one with an unknown probability. Camerer & Weber (1992) review the early experimental evidence generally confirming this intuition. In a more recent study, Ahn et al. (2007) compare various empirical measures.
In order to test for this effect here, we begin by inducing a representative sample of undergraduates, namely almost all students in several pre-occurring groups, to voluntarily participate in the first phase of our experiment in which we measure ambiguity preferences (specific procedures are described in Section 2). This is by no means representative of the population at large, but if anything it is more homogeneousmaking it more difficult for us to observe selection effects within that group. In fact, even in this case, we do find a significant selection effect when those same students are invited to participate in a follow-up experiment via a randomly varied recruitment email. In particular, none of the emails that we used successfully led to the same underlying distribution of types as existed in the base population (sample frame).
The general issue of potential bias both in subject pools and in subject behaviors has been considered by experimental psychologists for many years (Orne 1962; Rosenthal 1973) .
Note that there are two distinct considerations: Who volunteers to participate in an experiment to begin with? And does their behavior change relative to other settings? The latter effect is sometimes referred to as a demand characteristic, since most studies find that subjects appear to conform their behavior to that which is 'demanded' by the researcher. But of course, without good evidence as to what the baseline population looks like, it is difficult or impossible to separate these effects. Experimental economics may suffer slightly less from both effects: the first because there is always payment for participating; and the second because often we have been interested not in individual differences but rather in comparing institutions or testing theories that are supposed to apply to everyone equally. Even within economics, this potential problem was discussed quite early (e.g., Kagel et al. 1979) , but it has received relatively little attention.
As it matures, however, experimental economics has become increasingly interested in behavior differences among groups, and here the selection effects are more acute. For instance, there are (or have appeared to be) robust gender differences in a variety of behaviors. One of these is risk-aversion, and in particular bidding behavior in first-price auctions. Women bid higher than men do, which is less risky, and therefore often earn less money. Chen et al. (2005) 
Experiment Design and Results

Phase 1 Design: Measuring Baseline Ambiguity Aversion
Our goal in Phase 1 was to determine the ambiguity preferences of a sample of subjects into which there would be little or no self-selection specific to our experiment. Our starting sample frame was the population from which economics experiments typically solicit: undergraduate students. We recruited subjects in two methods, both of which are particularly common in economics experiments. First, we asked students in a number of introductory economics courses to complete an ambiguity-aversion survey in the final ten minutes of a class. Second, a researcher approached every student he encountered at campus libraries and asked each student to complete the same ambiguity-aversion survey.
There was almost no Phase 1 self-selection (beyond taking undergraduate economics, and frequenting the library): all 94 students in the selected economics classes completed the survey, and 109 out of 111 of the approached library students completed the survey.
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The researcher first asked students whether they were willing to complete a brief survey in which one in three students earns money based on her responses. All students agreeing to participate signed an informed consent form. The researcher handed each student brief instructions, read the instructions aloud, invited subjects to ask questions, and gave her a survey to complete. Subjects were not informed that they would receive a future solicitation to participate in a subsequent experiment.
The survey (Appendix A) contains ten of Ellsberg's hypothetical urn gambles and collects basic demographic data. In each of five scenarios, there is a hypothetical urn containing 100 balls whose distribution of black and red balls is clearly stated (the known urn), and a second hypothetical urn also containing 100 red and black balls in total, but whose distribution of red and black balls is clearly stated as unknown (the ambiguous urn). 4 The five known urns are offered in order: 50 red and 50 black balls; 40 red and 60 black balls; 30 red and 70 black balls, 20 red and 80 black balls; and 10 red and 90 black balls. For each scenario, we presented the subject with two gambles:
(1) If we paid you $10 for pulling a red ball on your first try, would you pick from the "known" or the "ambiguous" urn?
(2) If we paid you $10 for pulling a black ball on your first try, would you pick from the "known" or the "ambiguous" urn?
Thus, we presented ten gambles to each subject, and for each gamble asked from which urn the subject would draw. Asking each gamble twice, once for red and once for black, eliminated the chance the subject had a preference for a color or mistrusted the administrator.
Phase 1 Ambiguity Aversion Classification
Based on Phase 1 survey responses, we place all Phase 1 participants into one of three categories: more ambiguity averse (Table 1, 69%) , not more ambiguity averse (27%), and unable to classify (4%). To classify subjects, we look at the first "known" urn distribution at which a subject chooses the ambiguous urn when betting on whether a red ball will be the first ball drawn. 5 We classify as "more ambiguity sensitive" those students who first choose the ambiguous urn for the red-ball bet when the known urn contains 30 red balls, and who continue to choose the ambiguous urn for the red-ball bet when the known urn contains fewer than 30 red balls. These subjects chose the known urn for both bets when the known urn contains either 50 or 40 red.
Seven subjects switched from the ambiguous urn to the known urn even though the known urn in each round became worse. We presume these individuals were not paying attention, or were not understanding the questions well, and thus categorize them as "unable to classify" and drop them from the analysis.
We classify all other subjects as "not more ambiguity averse." Note that we do not have a category "ambiguity neutral" or "ambiguity seeking" because only nine and five subjects, respectively, would have been categorized as such. We thus categorize as "not more ambiguity averse" the combination of ambiguity seeking (5 subjects), ambiguity neutral (9 subjects) and those that switched at the first round, when the odds were 40%
for the known urn (122 individuals).
In Table 2 we show, with both OLS and probit specifications, the (lack of) correlation between this classification and location of experiment, gender, year in school and major.
Phase 2 Solicitation: Observing the Decision to Participate
The real "experiment" in Phase 2 is simply the decision to respond to our email solicitation. Our goal is to determine whether ambiguity preferences affect the decision to participate in laboratory experiments, and then more specifically whether different email solicitations affect this selection decision differentially.
We randomly assigned subjects to one of four recruitment treatments (i.e., ambiguity classification is orthogonal to treatment assignment). Treatments differ only in the amount of detail provided in the invitation email. We employ a 2x2 design, with each respondent receiving either an ambiguous or detailed description of their task, and either an ambiguous or detailed description of their payout. The "standard" email sent at
Williams College, and elsewhere (Davis and Holt, 1992) , is closest to the ambiguous task/ambiguous pay email. Here each participant is also informed that they will play a game in which they will decide how much of their participation fee they want to contribute to charity, and then will play games of uncertainty, choosing between known and ambiguous urns. Appendix C provides the detail on the activities in Phase 2. We do not use any of these data in this paper, since the sample size is too small for meaningful distributional analysis (to observe whether the differential selection drew in different people, which then would lead to different analytical results for the Phase 2 games themselves). Table 3 presents the key selection results as comparison of means, and Table 4 presents them in a probit specification. First note that Table 3 , Row A demonstrates orthogonality of ambiguity aversion to assignment to each email treatment, and Appendix Table 1 demonstrates the same for other known demographic variables.
We have two key hypotheses:
Hypothesis #1: Those who participate in laboratory experiments do not differ with respect to ambiguity aversion from those who do not participate. Table 3 Column 1 tests this hypothesis with mean comparison, and Table 4 Column 1 tests this hypothesis with a probit specification. We cannot reject the null hypothesis.
Those who participate in Phase 2 are no more or less ambiguity averse than those who do not. Note that this is a pooled analysis, across all four treatment solicitation emails.
Thus, although we cannot reject the null hypothesis, this null is under the setting of a blend of solicitation approaches. We now turn to examine heterogeneity generated by the different solicitations.
Hypothesis #2: The level of ambiguity in each solicitation does not generate differential selection on ambiguity personality characteristics with respect to who participates.
In Table 3 columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, we test this hypothesis with respect to ambiguity on both task and payout. Row A in columns 2 and 3 shows the average ambiguity aversion for those that received either the ambiguous task or the detailed task is 28.4% in both cases (the randomization was stratified on ambiguity, hence the perfect orthogonality).
However, comparing rows B and C shows that the ambiguous task generates differential selection towards those less ambiguity averse (p-value 0.079), and that the detailed task similarly generates reverse selection towards the more ambiguity averse (p-value 0.014).
Similar tests for ambiguity on the payment, however, do not yield statistically significant differences (nor are they signed as predicted). We discuss this in the conclusion with conjectures as to why the ambiguous payout treatment did not generate differential selection, whereas the ambiguous task treatment did. Table 4 shows similar results, in a probit specification. Column 2 shows that the ambiguous task generates a 6.9 percentage point higher participation rate (not statistically significant) and the ambiguous email task generates a 9.4 percentage point higher participation rate (significant at 90%). Column 3 presents the key results on heterogeneity induced by the solicitation. Here, we interact the email treatment with whether the individual is ambiguity averse or not. We find the same pattern shown in Table 3 , that the ambiguous task treatment deters the ambiguity averse from participating (significant at 99%), but that the ambiguous payout treatment does not generate differential selection patterns.
Conclusion
We examine a new facet of selection into laboratory experiments: ambiguity aversion.
We find that the method of solicitation generates potentially important heterogeneity with respect to ambiguity aversion in the sample frame that participates in experiments. Thus if ambiguity aversion could influence the choices participants make, experimentalists should note that the solicitation used could generate higher or lower participation rates, depending on how much information is given in the solicitation. Further research could shed insight on two areas. First, with a larger sample size, further analysis could be done to examine whether analytical results change depending on the solicitation method.
Second, it would be useful to know whether other solicitation methods could generate a more representative population. For instance, paying more money could generate higher participation rates, or alternative wording, somewhere in between our ambiguous and detailed treatments, may yield the optimal results. In our setting, it is key to note that we found no treatment which drew in a representative population.
Although we find differential selection from the ambiguous task treatment, we do not find differential selection from the ambiguous payout treatment. We have two conjectures for why this may be. First, perhaps the information was simply not ambiguous enough. We stated that they would win between $10 and $20, and although this adheres to the canonical urn question fairly accurately, if read quickly it could be perceived as more informative than intended. Second, it is possible that recipients of the email did not trust the researcher (whereas in the urn questions, mistrust of the researcher should not confound the analysis by design), and thus simply assumed that this really means $10, except for very few who would win the $20.
These results are important not just for laboratory experiments; similar issues apply to field experiments. We think about two types of field experiments here, "artefactual" or "framed" field experiments, using the Harrison and List taxonomy (Harrison and List, 2004) , and "natural" field experiments or for that matter any observational data collection. First, with respect to those cognizant of being "researched" (artefactual or framed), the results here are potentially just as applicable in the field as in the laboratory:
no method of solicitation in our experiment generated a representative sample frame.
Typical methods in the field could have similar issues, e.g., those who are more social, those who are more likely to think the games could lead to NGO handouts, those who are more curious, etc., are all more likely to participate, and the method of solicitation could exacerbate any of these issues. 7 Regarding "natural" field experiments or any surveying process, the issues raised here are also relevant. The fundamental idea is not new:
external validity. This paper sheds insight into how the solicitation method can generate more (or, ideally, less) selection which then influences the external validity of the study.
7 Recall Malani (2008) , which finds exactly such a problem in the context of medical trials. Had anything been significant statistically, then * would have indicated significance at 10 percent; ** at 5 percent; and *** at 1 percent. Information on major unavailable for freshmen and sophomores. 
Appendix A: Phase 1 Experiment Instructions
In this experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices. In each scenario, there are two urns. Both will always contain 100 balls, each ball being either red or black. In each scenario, you will know the exact number of black and red balls in one urn, but you will not know the number of each color in the second urn, only that there are 100 balls in the second urn and every ball is either red or black. The balls are well mixed so that each individual ball is as likely to be drawn as any other.
After all questionnaires have been completed, the experimenter will select at random onethird of all questionnaires. For each questionnaire selected, the experimenter will randomly select one of the five scenarios, with each scenario as likely to be drawn as any other. The experimenter will then randomly select one of the two questions within the selected scenario, with each question as likely to be selected as the other. Finally, if your questionnaire is selected, a ball will be drawn on your behalf, with each ball as likely to be drawn as any other.
Finally, please note that there are no tricks in this experiment. While in each scenario there is an urn for which you do not know the number of black and red balls, the number of unknown balls of each type already has been selected at random and is on file with the Williams College Department of Economics. Likewise, the pull of a ball from a chosen urn will truly be done at random via a process overseen by the Department of Economics.
[We present 5 of the following questions, with M=1,2,3,4,5.] In the first section, you will have the opportunity, in private, to donate part of your show up fee to a charity. The amount you give to the charity will be matched by the experimenter.
In the second section, you will be asked to make a series of decisions. For each decision, you will be asked to choose one of two options where the outcome of each option is uncertain. In some decisions, you will know the probability of each outcome within each option. In other decisions, you will not know the probability of each outcome for one of the options. After you have made your decisions, we will randomly select some of your decisions and you will be paid according to your choices.
Ambiguous Task, Detailed Payment Email
I am writing to inform you of an opportunity to participate in an Economics Department experiment on Tuesday, February 20th from 7:00 PM until 10:00 PM in Hopkins 108.
You will earn either $10 or $20 by participating in this experiment. The experiment is designed so that you have a 50% chance of earning $10 and a 50% chance of earning $20. The session will last about 30 minutes.
Detailed Task, Detailed Payment Email
I am writing to inform you of an opportunity to participate in an Economics Department experiment on Tuesday, February 20th from 7:00 PM until 10:00pm in Hopkins 108. You will earn either $10 or $20 by participating in this experiment. The experiment is designed so that you have a 50% chance of earning $10 and a 50% chance of earning $20. The session will last about 30 minutes. The experiment will consist of two sections.
In the first section, you will have the opportunity, in private, to donate part of your show up fee to a charity. The amount you give to the charity will be matched by the experimenter.
All Four Emails:
To sign up to participate in this experiment, please click on the link below.
Appendix C: Phase 2 Experiment Instructions
[Italicized text in brackets details how subject instructions vary. Text in braces identifies the alternative text.]
Welcome to this experiment on decision-making and thank you for being here. You will be compensated for your participation in the experiment, though the exact amount you will receive will depend on the choices you make, and on random chance. Even though you will make twenty decisions, only one of these will end up being used to determine your payment. Please pay careful attention to these instructions, as a significant amount of money is at stake.
Information about the choices that you make during the experiment will be kept strictly confidential. In order to maintain privacy and confidentiality, please do not speak to anyone during the experiment and please do not discuss your choices with anyone even after the conclusion of the experiment.
This experiment has four parts. First, you will be asked to make a series of decisions regarding charitable donations. In the second and third sections, you will be asked to make a series of choices between options, where the outcome of each option is not known with certainty. Finally, you will be asked a series of questions which you will either agree or disagree with along a scale. More detailed instructions will follow in each section.
Part I:
Today you received four envelopes: a "Start" envelope, a "Me" envelope, a "1" envelope, and a "2" envelope. In the start envelope you will find ten $1 bills and ten dollar-size pieces of blank paper. You will now have the opportunity to share part or all of the $10 with one or both of two charities. Any money that you donate to either charity will be matched, meaning every dollar you donate will result in the charity receiving two dollars.
You may donate as much or as little of the $10 to each of these charities as you wish by placing dollar bills in the corresponding envelopes. At the end of the experiment, you will keep the "Me" envelope and any dollar bills you place in that envelope.
[ You will be making 10 choices between two lotteries, such as those represented as "Option A" and "Option B" below. The money prizes are determined by the computer equivalent of rolling a ten-sided die. Each outcome, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, is equally likely. A computer generated "roll" for that decision will be made and you will be paid based on your decision.
Finally, please note that there are no tricks in this experiment. The roll will truly be done at random via a process overseen by the Department of Economics.
[ In this section you will be asked to make a series of choices. In each scenario, there are two urns. Both will always contain 100 balls, each ball being either red or black. In each scenario, you will know the exact number of black and red balls in one urn, but you will not know the number of each color in the second urn, only that there are 100 balls in the second urn and every ball is either red or black. The balls are well mixed so that each individual ball is as likely to be drawn as any other.
For each questionnaire selected, the experimenter will randomly select one of the five scenarios, with each scenario as likely to be drawn as any other. The experimenter will then randomly select one of the two questions within the selected scenario, with each question as likely to be selected as the other. Finally, if your questionnaire is selected, a ball will be drawn on your behalf, with each ball as likely to be drawn as any other.
[ 
